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In his explanation of the Photo-Electric Effect Einstein defines his photons as ?energy quanta which are localised at points in space? and possessed of a frequency E = hv at the very same time. (Rbv/N in his text.) Thus we are told that energy is quantized, because rather than a field spreading continuously over a region, ?light is discontinuously distributed in space?. [Einstein, 1965 (1905), p. 368] Planck's notion of quantization meant the discrete spectrum of eigen states (or eigen frequencies) of a single oscillator, sufficient in itself to make quantization manifest. But in order that a photon can make its own ?quantization' manifest it needs another photon. Alone it is just a speck in space. In Planck's original it would not be enough, it would not even be relevant, to call cars in a car park ?quantized', mainly because they are ?discontinuously distributed in space'. My aunt and I are thus distributed. Are we quantized? To Einstein it seems we must be.

Yet, albeit discontinuously distributed at points in space, photons have a ...frequency in this new setting! I cannot even begin to fathom how anything localized at a point can have a frequency, but what I do fathom is how Duality sprang forth from precisely this infected womb, now weirdly impregnated by an unlovely hybrid. To get back to QM as it was initially conceived, I reinterpret E = hv, now Et = h, and p = h/l, now pl = h, as alternative definitions of quantized action, committed to neither waves nor particles. I conclude with what Duality really was in the mind of the man so wrongly accused for its introduction: Niels Bohr. Namely, it is but the side product of Indivisibility (?wholeness' more frequently in his writings) - not a primitive QM axiom at all.

I show that the quantum relations, E = hv and p = h / L are sufficient for deriving the two corresponding uncertainties, and need no help from the Fourier analysis, as is the typical method.  If v involves a period t > 0 that is the minimum time interval needed to define E, then defining E any sooner will introduce an uncertainty in its value proportional to how much sooner.  And if L stands for a minimum distance needed to define p, then defining p in any shorter distance will introduce an uncertainty in its value, proportional to the amount shorter.  Since, however, E is to be defined over t, and not sooner, Et = h. And since p is to be defined over L, and not shorter, pL = h. Hence, altogether,  dEdt, dpdq >= h.  In the Fourier treatment, however, E = hv does not suffice to deduce dEdt >= h; another premise, dvdt >= 1, is equally necessary to the deduction. Inclusion of this extraneous premise literally transforms this uncertainty from a lim-ited, and therefore manageable, energy-time opposition, into an unlimited, and therefore unmanageable, opposition, demanding all kinds of absurdities for its satisfaction, as several reliable commentators have noted since the early 60?s. These problems are inherent in the Fourier approach, but my derivation escapes them.

The notion of a first ever moment of Time is selfcontradictory: In lacking a moment before it, it lacks a lower barrier, so there is no stopping it from?inconsistently?receding further and further into an infinitely remote past. Hence, there cannot be a beginning of Time. Only a beginning in Time. The notion of the expansion or growth of Space is incoherent. Objects growing in Space grow by taking up more of space. But for Space to do that, Space must take up more of space, and in order to do that Space must be larger than it is. Hence, there can be no expansion of Space. (Only one in space.) Furthermore, there is no such thing as ?the Universe.? ?The Universe? denotes no special object; in fact, it denotes no object of any kind. The fact that all things have a cause does not mean that ?the Universe? has a cause any more than the fact that all men have a mother means that Humanity has a mother. Hence ?the Universe? does not have a cause. ?The Universe? does not have an age. ?The universe? is a short hand, comprehensive reference to all things that exist. And things being many, they have many ages . Hence, there is no such thing as the age of ?the universe,? unless we mean an ...average age. ?The Universe? is just an inventory word, an inventory meant to be exhaustive. And inventories have no size. (I guess.) Hence, ?the universe? has no size either. Universe expansion theorists mention an ?observation', documenting the fact that galaxies drift apart from one another, without however having moved an inch! ?Only the space in-between them grows.? This is the sort of empirical confirmation that a theory of the sort here criticized truly deserves.

Some elementary logical facts are recalled, such as, that growing in space presupposes space, or that the growing of things in space is not at all like the (alleged) growing of space. It is argued that space is not even a thing in the first place (I can take the picture of an object in space; but can I take the picture of space?) It is shown that questions of the type ?does space grow? = ?what is the extension of space? = ?what is the extension of extension?, are completely meaningless. Finally, it is proved that Einstein?s equation for length contraction, rather than contradicting the existence of a constant space, in actual fact presupposes it.

What I am about to propose is relatively easy to state. I will argue that Bohr's philosophy is perfectly compatible with the case made by EPR. It is, however, just as relatively easy to misunderstand. What I am contending is that it is "Bohr's philosophy which is so compatible. Not that his reply to EPR is. In fact, and despite a considerable bulk of literature floating about, I consider Bohr's Reply to EPR utterly unsuccessful in itself and thoroughly incompatible with the EPR case. It was so designed to be.